Entrepreneurship and financial inclusion through the lens of instrumental freedoms by Kimmitt, Jonathan & Munoz, Pablo
 1 
NOTICE  
This is the author’s version of a co-authored work that is accepted for publication in International Small 
Business Journal  
 
Kimmitt, J., Muñoz, P. (in press) Entrepreneurship and financial inclusion through the lens of instrumental 
freedoms. International Small Business Journal 
 
© Sage  
Changes introduced as a result of copy-editing, formatting and the final publishing processes may not be 
reflected in this document. For the definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source at: http://journals.sagepub.com/home/isb ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________	 
 
 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION THROUGH THE 
LENS OF INSTRUMENTAL FREEDOMS  
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the interrelated nature of instrumental freedoms and how they 
combine to engender financial inclusion amongst low income entrepreneurs. Drawing from 
Sen’s capabilities approach, we emphasize a need for understanding the freedoms 
associated with institutional arrangements and the complex causal processes that lead to 
financial inclusion amongst micro-entrepreneurs. We perform a Fuzzy Set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis of 19 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. The findings 
indicate four causal combinations for financial inclusion. Our findings indicate that no 
single instrumental freedom is necessary for financial inclusion; it does not necessarily 
depend on the provision of microfinance and that political freedom is an important 
peripheral condition for inclusion. This allows us to question some of the assumptions 
about how microfinance operates amidst a set of complex institutional instrumental 
freedoms.  
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Introduction  
Microfinance represents a method of financial inclusion that integrates individuals into the 
formal financial system (Yunus, 1999), which is widely considered to foster 
entrepreneurial activity such as new business creation (Attanasio et al., 2015; Augsburg et 
al., 2015; Shahriar, Schwarz and Newman, 2015), growth (Ferdousi, 2015; Field et al., 
2013) and improved personal income for entrepreneurs (Chliova et al., 2015). Such 
inclusive methods to facilitating entrepreneurship “aspire to create opportunities that 
enhance social and economic well-being for disenfranchised members of society” (George 
et al. 2012, p. 663). Despite the research and policy emphasis on microfinance and financial 
inclusion (Ansari, Munir, and Gregg, 2012; Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli, and Klapper 2012), and 
how it fosters entrepreneurial activity (Bruton et al., 2011; Bradley McMullen, Artz, and 
Simiyu, 2011; McMullen 2011), we still know very little about the conditions under which 
this flourishes amongst this population of micro-entrepreneurs (i.e. the provision of 
microfinance services to the entrepreneurial poor), in particular those conditions related to 
the complex set of institutional instrumental freedoms an entrepreneur experiences. In this 
context, we seek to answer the following question: how do the interrelated nature of 
instrumental freedoms combine to engender financial inclusion amongst micro-
entrepreneurs?  
Increasingly, entrepreneurship scholars have identified the interrelationship between 
entrepreneurs and their (institutional) contexts (Lang, Fink and Kilber, 2013; Welter, 2011; 
Williams and Vorley, 2014; Zahra, Wright, and Abdelgawad, 2014). In this vein, one 
consistent theme in the literature is microfinance’s relationship with institutions, based on 
the premise that the development of a sound financial system requires support from other 
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aspects of the institutional context (e.g. legal/regulatory) which influences how 
entrepreneurial finance is channeled to micro-entrepreneurs in developing economies (Eid 
2005; Levine, 1998; Shleifer, 1997). However, current efforts reduce institutional 
explanations to the effects of their individual components; how the legal protection of 
lending activities and ease of starting a business influences an MFIs willingness to fund 
start-ups (Shahriar, Schwarz and Newman, 2015); the impact that a country’s regulatory 
environment has on the performance of MFIs in periods of financial crisis (Silva and 
Chávez, 2015); the willingness of entrepreneurs to borrow from MFIs depending on the 
strength of political or economic institutions (Kimmitt, Scarlata and Dimov, 2016); or the 
moderating effect of different aspects of institutions on entrepreneurial outcomes (Chliova, 
Brinckmann and Rosenbusch, 2015). This is problematic because it does not consider 
institutional elements together, which is central to further understanding how contexts, 
holistically, constrain or facilitate human agency and how agency and institutional 
complexity interact with each other (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, and 
Lounsbury, 2011; Munoz and Kibler, 2016). In addition, given the limited diversity of the 
contexts of interest and the limitations of linear methods, empirical efforts in this area have 
limited analytical power and the explanations drawn from such studies are partial at best. 
In this paper, we take the position that elements of institutions should be taken together 
in respect of their joint and complimentary importance. This builds explicitly from Sen’s 
(1999) capabilities approach which recognizes the interrelated empirical link between 
different aspects of institutions which should be viewed as “instrumental freedoms”. In 
Sen’s perspective, capabilities are understood to be the freedoms a person has to achieve 
certain life goals and activities which are functions of their institutionally driven 
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instrumental freedoms (economic facilities; political freedoms; social opportunities; 
transparency and protective security). Such freedoms represent critical means for 
capabilities as they contribute to the ability of a person to live more freely and thus “directly 
enhance the capabilities of people” (p.40). The ability to establish business premises 
without fear of harassment, having variable access to an education, enforcing terms of a 
contract and/or whether bribes are part of the business culture all represent examples of 
instrumental freedoms that may make financial inclusion for micro-entrepreneurs more or 
less possible. Of course, MFIs have been particularly instrumental as a type of economic 
facility designed to spur entrepreneurial outcomes through financial inclusion (Bruton et 
al., 2011; Khavul, 2010). Although there appears a well-established link between the 
economic facility of microfinance and the financial inclusion of entrepreneurs, we know 
very little about the holistic interaction between this and the other institutionally driven 
instrumental freedoms. 
Sen’s theory is holistic; thus freedoms only make sense if seen together because they 
are interconnected and complement each other. As such, any empirical effort aimed at 
examining the effect of instrumental freedoms would require combinatorial thinking and 
an appropriate methodological approach capable of observing and analyzing 
configurations of instrumental freedoms, rather than their individual effect on the outcome 
of interest. To examine this idea, we draw from multiple data sources from Latin America 
and the Caribbean to perform a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis - fs/QCA (Ragin, 
2008). We examine Sen’s (1999; 2005) instrumental freedoms against the degree of 
financial inclusion amongst micro-entrepreneurs to capture the joint and interdependent 
effect of institutions on the use of microcredit. Our configurational assessment suggests 
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that no single instrumental freedom is necessary for financial inclusion. It rather shows that 
financial inclusion can follow from four distinct combinations of conditions, which 
collectively explain how different combinations of institutional freedoms enable, and in 
some cases constrain, strong rates of microfinance use amongst micro-entrepreneurs. 
Instead of highlighting the necessary “perfect” institutional contexts for financial inclusion, 
our analysis shows that financial inclusion can also emerge under odd sets of conditions, 
in rather counterintuitive contexts lacking normally assumed necessary conditions, for 
example, widespread and intensive microfinance provision to entrepreneurs.  
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, by looking at the distinct 
combination of instrumental freedoms leading to financial inclusion - assessed by means 
of microfinance rates amongst micro entrepreneurs in developing contexts - this paper 
enhances scholarly understanding of whether and how microfinance fosters inclusive 
activities amongst micro-entrepreneurs (George et al., 2012). Second, the theoretical 
propositions developed by Newman, Schwarz and Borgia (2013) argue that microfinance 
can produce various social and psychological outcomes at the individual level. Whilst they 
acknowledge that this process depends on ‘microfinance provision’ they do not delve into 
the antecedents of this inclusivity issue. Thus, this paper helps yield further insight into 
entrepreneurship, microfinance and institutions in emerging economy settings (Smallbone 
Welter, and Ateljevic, 2013). Finally, our methodological approach, combined with our 
theoretical lens, enables a more fine-grained understanding of particular institutional 
contexts, in particular of how financial inclusion amongst micro-entrepreneurs can surface 
from an array of combinations of instrumental freedoms - logical and counterintuitive 
forms - which can only be adequately observed when taken together. In doing so, our work 
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overcomes the limitations of previous research at the intersection of entrepreneurship, 
inclusion and institutions which so far have shown pieces of puzzle, but have not yet 
explained how instrumental freedoms, in their present and absent forms, can uniquely (and 
surprisingly) combine to foster financial inclusion.          
The paper is structured as follows. Firstly, we outline the distinction between 
institutions and instrumental freedoms before discussing prior research related to each 
individual freedom. Secondly, we present the methodology – a fuzzy set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis – that allows us to understand the complex interactions between the 
freedoms and those causal combinations leading to financial inclusion. Thirdly, we discuss 
and interpret the configurational analysis before outlining our contribution to the literature 
and offering areas for further empirical work.   
 
Background Literature 
Entrepreneurship research acknowledges that entrepreneurial activity is influenced by 
institutions, as they determine incentive structures and shape decision-making (Baumol 
1990; Bianchi, 2010; Sautet, 2013). Institutions are viewed as “the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990) with political and economic 
structures explaining the nature of markets and entrepreneurial action in developing 
economies (McMullen, 2011). These are both formal and informal, since at their basis we 
can find not only regulative rules, but also cognitive and normative rules, which Scott 
(2001) identifies as the pillars of institutions.  
 7 
In the face of the evidence that economies in developing countries have failed to grow 
(Easterly, 2001), scholars have established that institutions play an instrumental role in 
linking entrepreneurial activity with economic outcomes (Acs and Virgill, 2010). Indeed, 
there are long standing arguments that traditional regulatory theory, as applied to 
entrepreneurship in developed countries, does not readily translate to contexts where 
institutional weakness or ‘imperfection’ is prominent (Easterly and Levine 1997, North 
1987, 1990, Roth and Kostova, 2003). For entrepreneurs, such institutional features 
produce a series of challenges with increases in transaction costs limiting the 
appropriability of entrepreneurial rents, which in turn reduce the perceived attractiveness 
of entrepreneurial opportunities and can lead to suppression of start-up activity (Baker 
Gedajlovic, and Lubatkin, 2005). What is overwhelmingly clear from extant research is 
that particular types of institutional arrangements provide entrepreneurs with a set of 
conditions that shape their judgments and actions they take.  
Similarly, notions of ‘capacity building’ or ‘institutional strengthening’ have been a 
valid feature of development policy in recent times (e.g. Eade, 2007). However, the current 
view of institutions within the literature is problematic in a context of financial inclusion 
because it assumes the need for a particular set of institutional arrangements which has 
little account for freedoms within those settings. Institutional development is often viewed 
as an important outcome of structural development with the presumption that when the 
institutions are “right” this leads to a particular set of desirable outcomes (e.g. financial 
inclusion and poverty reduction). Sen (2009) describes this position as ‘transcendental 
institutionalism’ that ignores the complex interrelations between institutions and the actual 
freedoms individuals and entrepreneurs experience (Sen, 2009). In Sen’s (1999) view, 
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there exist important empirical connections between different elements of institutions that 
can produce varying outcomes and if we take the transcendental view then we may ignore 
the multiple pathways to (un)desirable outcomes. This suggests that a search for a perfect 
recipe for institutional conditions that leads to financial inclusion is misguided.  
To understand the complex drivers of development, Sen (1999; 2005) proposed the 
use of a ‘capabilities approach’ to poverty which shifts poverty analysis onto the non-
monetary factors that produce development outcomes. According to Sen, poverty 
alleviation concerns enabling a person’s freedoms or understanding what is constraining 
their freedoms to realize certain goals and activities which comprise their 
livelihood (Alkire, 2005) and ‘what they do’ (Anand et al., 2009). The underlying 
philosophy of this approach is to tackle the assessment of development and growth through 
the use of traditional economic measurable estimators, mainly gross domestic product or 
household income.  
One of the key concepts in the capabilities approach is ‘achieved functionings’. 
Functionings substantively reveal what a person does and the choices that they actually 
make and is the typical analytical focus in the capabilities approach (Anand et al., 2009). 
Functionings is an umbrella term for the resources and activities recognized as making up 
a person’s wellbeing (Alkire, 2005). In this capabilities perspective, an entrepreneur’s use 
of microcredit is seen as a functioning in the sense that it represents an expansion of 
freedoms based on their ability to use resources and pursue entrepreneurial activities they 
previously were not able to (Gries and Naudé, 2011). In this respect, financial inclusion 
represents an expansion of capabilities for micro-entrepreneurs.  
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But these capabilities are guided by and intertwined with institutional arrangements. 
These institutional arrangements determine an individual’s political freedoms, access to 
economic facilities, social opportunities and so forth (Sen, 2005; Nussbaum, 
2000). Substantive freedom, understood as the enhancement human capabilities, is both 
the end and the means of development. Freedom, in Sen’s view, is not a single entity. It 
rather manifests itself through five distinct institutional instrumental freedoms: 1) 
economic facilities; 2) protective security 3) political freedoms; 4) social opportunities; 
and 5) transparency. These freedoms are complementary and mutually reinforcing and of 
particular analytical importance because of their instrumental function that allows for 
enhanced functionings. They represent a more useful focus for poverty analysis into 
financial inclusion because they take into account the freedoms an individual actually 
experiences in their institutional context and the complex interrelations between these types 
of freedom.  
 
Instrumental Freedoms and Financial Inclusivity 
In terms of economic facilities (i.e. financial services), research demonstrates that the 
underdevelopment of the financial sector can lead individuals into ‘poverty 
traps’ (Berthelemy and Varoudakis, 1996). They can constrain individuals from pursuing a 
particular course of action from a number of alternatives (Sen, 2005). Indeed, this is 
reflected in World Bank data which demonstrate that access to finance is the single most 
pervasive issue facing both individuals and businesses in Sub-Saharan Africa, with 41.2% 
of small businesses revealing credit constraints more so than any other region in the world 
(Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2008; Honohan, 2007). Thus, a lack of access to economic 
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facilities distorts a person’s ability to pursue the life goals they value, to freely choose 
amongst life options and have the necessary agency to do so (Alkire, 2005; Gries and 
Naudé, 2011). 
This instrumental freedom is directly relevant to financial inclusivity and the 
microfinance sector. The purpose of MFIs is to directly address the absence of this 
instrumental freedom by providing entrepreneurs with access to small loans for the 
development of their ventures. Through stimulated entrepreneurial activity, the logic is that 
poor individuals will be able to more effectively be able to participate in economic 
exchange. The social impact of entrepreneurial activity has been largely documented by 
prior research and presented as a vital part of social development as well as economic 
growth (Minniti and Lévesque, 2010), and societal change (Acs and Virgill, 2010; 
Schumpeter, 1934), all antecedents to poverty eradication (Helms, 2006; Dollar and Kraay, 
2002; Chliova et al., 2015; Venkataraman, 1997). The basic premise of microfinance, 
therefore, is that financial inclusion is an important functioning for a micro-entrepreneur. 
However, we know very little about how this approach to inclusivity is empirically 
connected to the other critical instrumental freedoms identified by Sen.   
In terms of protective security, Baker et al. (2005) highlight how nations with such 
securities in place (e.g. strong welfare systems) tend to have lower levels of entrepreneurial 
activity than those without. In their absence, individuals who may otherwise use state 
support may be pushed into entrepreneurship out of necessity when paid opportunities for 
unemployment are unavailable (Acs and Virgill, 2010). Developing economies are 
characterized by serious income insecurity, meaning that it is not simply about a lack of 
income but inconsistency in terms of when that income arrives (Banerjee 2007). This 
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makes the provision of safety nets particularly critical. This is particularly pertinent to 
microfinance where the group-lending format typically provides a supportive environment 
when entrepreneurs find themselves in financial difficulty (Webb et al., 2010; Yunus, 
1999). In addition, in a microfinance context the concepts of protective security and 
economic facilities are closely linked because of how they improve the financial security 
of individuals.  
In terms of political freedoms, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue that the 
development of inclusive economic institutions is preceded by the adequate development 
of inclusive political systems. Political institutions which are ‘extractive’ (e.g. autocratic 
rule/weak governance) tend to block socio-economic innovation which leads to long term 
non-inclusive consequences. These institutions can create markets which function 
effectively (i.e. China) but the political system, governed by minority rule or elitism, offers 
little or no incentive for innovative entrepreneurial firms (Bradley et al., 2012; Schumpeter 
1934). From an entrepreneur’s view, Kimmitt et al. (2016) identify that under-developed 
political institutions lead firms to borrow more microcredit and Chliova et al. (2015) 
highlight that women’s empowerment is more profound amongst microcredit 
entrepreneurs where there are greater political freedoms. Thus, the political freedoms 
associated with a particular context can have distinct manifestations for how entrepreneurs 
access and use microcredit. Sen (1999) particularly highlights that political freedoms tend 
to be closely associated with economic freedoms because a freedom of expression and 
action are important for individuals to make the most of their economic freedoms.     
In terms of social opportunities, according to Sen (1999, p.39) the adequate provision 
of education reflects an important social opportunity which give individuals the 
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“substantive freedom to live better”. In developing economies, education is particularly 
critical because of how it assorts individual into particular labor roles (Baker et al., 2005). 
Berkowtitz and De Jong’s (2005) study on the relationship between economic growth and 
entrepreneurship demonstrated a positive effect of education on entrepreneurial outcomes. 
However, education’s assortment of roles, as identified by Baker et al. (2005), produces 
inequalities through social stratification. For example, during South Africa’s apartheid 
regime state institutions ensured the promotion of educational rights for white minorities 
thus reducing the social mobility of the black population and entrenching social inequalities 
(Seidman 1999). Additionally, Buchmann and Hannum (2001) demonstrate that 
educational stratification determines occupational attainment and social mobility which are 
synonymous with family background. 
Baker et al. (2005) refer to this as social stratification; i.e. institutional processes which 
partition society into advantaged and disadvantaged groups which is at the heart of 
inequality (Robinson, Blockson, and Robinson, 2007). These are structural level 
differentiations within society where it is typically difficult for an individual to be able to 
move from a lower to an upper stratum because of inequalities (Ravlin and Thomas 2005). 
This perspective suggests that as a result of these processes, large portions of the labor 
force in developing economies take up certain economic roles and are therefore exposed to 
certain experiences or ‘knowledge corridors’ (Ronstadt, 1988). Thus, widening access to 
education, as an instrumental freedom, lends itself to generally more inclusive economic 
and social outcomes (Acs and Virgill 2010; Baker et al., 2005; Martinelli 1994). This is 
consistent with recent studies from developing economies which emphasize that inclusivity 
requires sufficient expertise and knowledge in conjunction with access to financial capital 
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(Bradley et al., 2012). Given the approach adopted by some MFIs, to provide financial and/ 
or business training to micro-entrepreneurs, we would expect to see this to be an important 
instrumental freedom for financial inclusion. Simultaneously, education levels are likely 
to represent important tangible proxies for loan officers in their selection decisions (Bruns, 
Holland, Shepherd, and Wiklund, 2008; Canales, 2014).  
In terms of transparency, research has consistently highlighted a link between 
corruption and capabilities. In corrupt environments, individuals’ capabilities are 
exacerbated which can distort incentives for entrepreneurial action (Budak and Rajh, 2014; 
Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme, 2002). Further reduction in such incentives results 
from the harassment associated with trading (Fadahunsi and Rosa, 2002), scaling down of 
the financial capital needs of entrepreneurs (Takyi-Asiedu, 1993), and a more general 
reluctance to invest in growth projects (McMillan and Woodruff, 2002). In addition, 
corruption is closely tied with the legal framework of a nation. Legal constraints erode 
profit making incentives for firms (Hoffman, 1999). Well-developed legal environments 
reduce uncertainties for firms, allowing them to form expectations about future 
performance (McMullen, 2011; Scully, 1988). Indeed, Silva and Chávez (2015) show that 
rule of law is particularly critical for MFI performance and outreach. Therefore, we would 
expect to see transparency as an important explanatory factor for inclusive microfinance 
activity amongst micro-entrepreneurs.  
In summary, we can observe the significance of each of Sen’s instrumental freedoms 
within their own right. Individually, we have seen numerous empirical observations that 
highlight their role in developing inclusive development outcomes i.e. access to 
microcredit. However, we know very little about the empirical connections between each 
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freedom in relation to inclusivity – stressed by Sen (1999; 2005) as being of vital 
importance to understanding the relationship between institutions and capability outcomes. 
Using a capability lens, Chliova et al. (2015) suggest that microcredit use may be more 
pronounced in contexts of lower instrumental freedoms. When unpacking this relationship, 
they only consider each instrumental freedom individually without taking into account the 
mutually reinforcing connections between freedoms of different kinds, as was originally 
intended by Sen. Moreover, much of the extant research has focused on the supply (e.g. 
Mair and Marti, 2009; Khavul et al., 2013) or demand side (e.g. Kimmitt et al., 2016) of 
microfinance activity without recognizing that financial inclusivity occurs in a space of 
both provision by MFIs and microcredit use by entrepreneurs. Thus, in this paper we ask, 
how do the interrelated nature of instrumental freedoms combine to engender financial 
inclusivity for micro-entrepreneurs? 
 
Methodology 
Methodological approach 
In looking at how instrumental freedoms combine to produce financial inclusion in a 
developing context, this research draws on the strengths of fuzzy set qualitative 
comparative analysis - fs/QCA (Ragin, 2008). fs/QCA is a set-theoretic method that 
permits visualizing and analyzing complex causality and testing the necessity and 
sufficiency of particular conditions and combinations of conditions (Ragin 1999).  
By using Boolean algebra, counterfactual analysis and logical minimization, fs/QCA 
allows for comparing cases as configurations of factors (Ragin 2000), observing empirical 
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information in a more parsimonious manner, and subsequently making causal 
interpretations based on the logic of causal necessity and sufficiency (Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012). In doing so, it systematically compares different combinations of causal 
and outcome conditions (Ragin 2008a) to finally produce simplified combinations of 
causes that collectively explain the outcome under examination. Instead of searching for 
antecedent common conditions shared by all instances of the outcome - as traditional 
approaches to causal explanations do – fs/QCA focuses on and allows for equifinality, i.e. 
the possibility that the same outcome can follow from different combinations of conditions 
(Ragin, 2008). As a method and analytical technique originally developed for conducting 
cross-country comparisons, fs/QCA permits assessing robustly the necessity and 
sufficiency of conditions with a small number of cases (Leiberson, 1991). This is 
particularly relevant when cases are by nature small in number and the phenomenon is 
either episodic or unique to a specific context. These empirical contexts are restricted to 
alternative multivariate analyses such as cluster analysis or structural equation modeling, 
which require a large number of observations to robustly produce groups or estimate 
structural relationships. 
While fs/QCA focuses on identifying key recipes for a particular outcome, it does not 
ignore specific patterns and outliers. If a particular combination of conditions explains only 
single case, it is not considered as less relevant than other combination of conditions that 
explain the large majority of cases (Rihoux and Ragin 2008). Such case is not treated as an 
error or prematurely discarded, as traditional statistical analysis would do. This outlier 
situation simply illustrates that the outcome of interest can emerge under an odd 
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combination of conditions. Such a discovery is empirically rich and theoretically relevant, 
and particularly pertinent to our discussion of Uruguay (see below). 
 
Case selection and data collection 
Case selection in fs/QCA studies relies on a tentative and iterative process and is based on 
two key criteria: sufficient homogeneity and maximum heterogeneity (Rihoux and Ragin, 
2008). First, it requires an area of homogeneity, with cases sharing similar background 
characteristics. Second, within that area maximum heterogeneity of cases is required in 
terms of positive and negative outcomes.  Case selection in fs/QCA does not rely on 
mechanistic procedures, such as random sampling, but rather on a tentative and iterative 
process where the criteria of sufficient homogeneity and maximum heterogeneity are 
constantly pursued (Rihoux and Ragin 2008). The non-parametric nature of fs/QCA 
reduces the risk of sample selection biases (Fiss 2011), which generally affect research 
requiring random sampling (Berk 1983). 
Based on fs/CQA criteria and data availability and reliability, the research team 
purposively selected 19 countries (out of 32 in the region) from Latin America and the 
Caribbean (see Table 2 below). This region presents a distinct combination of history, 
culture, societal structures, political institutions and revolutions. Although most of the 
current political and economic institutions have been inherited from Europe during Latin 
America’s independence processes 200 years ago, the combination of these institutional 
forms with the local culture led to successive waves of reform, often resisted and 
superseded rather than fully assimilated, which transformed the socio-economic structure 
of this region into a unique mosaic of factors combining the politics of expertise, 
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privatization, poverty and inequality, and citizenship insecurity (Whitehead, 2006). Latin 
America and the Caribbean as a whole is the world's fourth largest economy, yet the most 
unequal region in the planet. In 2014 the richest 10 per cent of people in Latin America 
concentrated 71 per cent of the region’s wealth, and most of this wealth is held offshore in 
tax havens (World Economic Forum, 2016).  
The data we used in this study stems from several publicly available sources, such as 
IDB Multilateral Investment Fund’s Financial Inclusion Report 2014, United Nations’ 
Human Development Report, Gallup World Poll and Transparency International. In other 
to capture and assess the same background conditions, all data used in this study were 
collected during 2014 and reported in 2015.  
Measurement 
Economic facilities (freedom) and protective security were captured by looking at the 
provision of microfinance (MICROFINANCE) per country measured by microfinance US 
dollars available per inhabitant (US$MF/Hab). We combined economic freedom with 
protective security because the provision of microfinance loans tends to be interwoven with 
the use of savings, thus providing entrepreneurs with an income safety net i.e. protective 
security. In addition, in Latin America and the Caribbean, deposits represent the main 
source of funding in the region with the vast majority of deposits for MFIs stemming from 
voluntary (rather than compulsory) savings of their clients as conditions of existing or 
future loans1 (MIX Market, 2015). This demonstrates that the micro-entrepreneurs in our 
                                               
1 The Microfinance Market and Trends in Latin America and the Caribbean (2015) report indicates that 
73% of an MFI’s funding in the region comes from voluntary savings as tied to current or future access of a 
loan. 1% of MFI income as tied to current or future access of a loan is compulsory. The additional 26% 
represents income sources from institutions such as corporations, other financial institutions, or government 
agencies and is therefore not linked to client micro-entrepreneurs.  
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sample population are accessing and using loans whilst simultaneously making use of the 
savings products offered by MFIs; therefore experiencing economic freedom and protective 
security (of a safety net) together. In this sense, MFIs perform the role of a “proto-
institution” by providing economic freedom and protective security to entrepreneurs in 
times of need (Webb et al., 2010). For the sake of simplicity, we just use the terms 
economic freedom or microfinance throughout the rest of the paper.  
We constructed the measure by estimating the specific market size for microfinance, 
dividing the country’s portfolio size by the number of people living in the country (PPP). 
Data stems from IDB Multilateral Investment Fund’s Financial Inclusion Report 2014 
(Trujillo and Navajas, 2014) and the World Bank Development Research Group’s Poverty 
and Equity Data Base. Data are based on primary household survey data obtained from 
government statistical agencies and World Bank country departments. In minimizing the 
potential estimation error due to the difference in size of the countries under examination, 
we assessed the extent to which the microfinance portfolio, the number of microcredit 
clients and the number of MFI respond to the size of overall population and to the different 
segments of the population with income below the 5-, 4- and 2.5-dollar thresholds. Our 
correlation analysis found positive and significant correlations between all measures (see 
appendix A), increasing the reliability of our measure. Negative results would have 
suggested that within country differences were relevant enough to create disproportionate 
portfolio sizes skewed, for instance, by countries with a big population and high levels of 
inequality against others perhaps smaller and less unequal. 
In measuring social opportunities, we focused on equality in the attainment of 
education (EDUCATION). In order to do so, we reverse-coded UNPD’s inequality in the 
 19 
attainment of education, which captures the loss in potential education due to inequality. 
As previously highlighted, education is a key indicator for social inequality because of its 
role in assorting individuals into particular labor roles that determines their access to 
knowledge and other resources (Baker et al., 2005) and has been used in previous studies 
to represent Sen’s social opportunity instrumental freedom (Chliova et al., 2015). Using 
0=low and 1=high, it calculates the percentage difference between the Human 
Development Index Education Index, which comprises mean years of schooling and 
expected years of schooling, and the Inequality-adjusted Education Index. We would 
expect education to be particularly relevant to a microfinance setting because it has been 
shown to have a strong correlation with microfinance access even though many MFIs 
continues to offer finance accompanied by training in Latin America (Sanguinetti, 2011). 
However, given the dominance of individual rather than group lending in the region (MIX 
Market, 2015), access to education is likely to be particularly important when considering 
financial inclusion as MFIs adopt tangible proxies in their logic of selection (Baum and 
Silverman, 2004; Colombo and Grilli, 2010; Macmillan, Zemann, and Subbanarasimha 
1987).   
Political freedom was captured by looking at Freedom over life choices (CHOICES). 
It measures the extent to which people are satisfied or dissatisfied with their freedom to 
make decisions, indicating freedom from oppression, coercion, a right to criticize authority 
and freedom of expression, and action in their lives. The presence or absence of such a 
freedom implies not just a particular set of rules and procedures in a particular nation but 
whether entrepreneurs perceive themselves to be able to voice their needs (such as a need 
for financial support) and take advantage of opportunities (Sen, 1999). Freedom over life 
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choices is assessed on a 0-100 scale that captures the percentage of respondents answering 
satisfied to the question, “In this country, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your freedom 
to choose what you do with your life?” The data stems from Gallup World Poll specifically 
related to satisfaction pertaining to politics and institutions in Latin America (Arechavala 
and Espina, 2016). Prior empirical research similarly takes the view that such a definition 
– inclusive of an individual’s civil liberties within their political context – represents an 
accepted notion of political freedom (Fabro and Aixalá, 2012).  
Drawing from Transparency International Data, our measure for Transparency 
(TRANSPARENCY) assesses the perceived level of public sector corruption based on 
expert opinion, measured on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). This is a 
consistent measure with other studies that have used transparency as a measure of Sen’s 
capabilities (Kimmitt et al., 2016) or simply measured corruption in the context of a 
nation’s institutional quality (e.g. Sobel, 2008). Instead of focusing on the country or 
territory's position in the index, which is necessarily relative to the other countries and 
territories in the index, we focused on the actual raw values of transparency. 
In terms of outcome measure for financial inclusion (INCLUSION), we focused on 
the rate of microcredit in the particular context of interest. Using data from IDB 
Multilateral Investment Fund’s Financial Inclusion Report 2014 (Trujillo and Navajas, 
2014), we measured financial inclusion by estimating the rate of microcredit clients 
amongst micro-entrepreneurs. In order to capture financial inclusion within low-income 
segments, and not across all segments of micro-entrepreneurs, this estimation draws from 
two sources of relevant data. First, it captures the number of micro-entrepreneurs by 
looking at the categories Employees/Self-employed and Employers/Employer of 
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Household Surveys within low income segments in each country, as reported by World 
Development Indicators (WDI, 2013). Second, it estimates the number of micro-credit 
clients by looking at publicly available information or provided directly by financial system 
authorities, cooperatives regulators in each country, networks or federations of 
cooperatives, networks of microfinance institutions, and non-regulated credit providers 
(Trujillo and Navajas, 2014). The fact that this measure draws on data from both regulated 
(i.e. banks, financial societies and regulated organizations specialized in microfinance) and 
non-regulated (i.e. cooperatives, NGOs and LLC) institutions enables a more 
comprehensive and accurate estimation of the number of micro-credit clients within the 
segment of interest. This is relevant since regulated institutions in the region represent only 
33% of the total number of MFI institutions and 79% of the microcredit portfolio, serving 
just 2/3 of Latin-America’s microcredit borrowers (Trujillo and Navajas, 2014). 
The measure of financial inclusion is developed in accordance with current definitions 
of inclusion and other empirical insights. Firstly, we follow the definition of George et al. 
(2012) that distinguishes inclusive processes from outcomes. Process involves actions that 
promote inclusiveness which are structural barriers that block access to opportunity. In a 
capabilities framework, this refers to “having the levers of control in one’s own hands” 
(Sen, 1993, p. 522). Drawing further from Sen we also note that use of such economic 
facilities (i.e. microcredit) – as an instrumental freedom – “directly enhance the capabilities 
of people” (p.40). Secondly, there is significant empirical evidence supporting the link 
between financial inclusion and positive entrepreneurial outcomes such as new business 
creation, income, and business growth (Attanasio et al., 2015; Augsburg et al., 2015; 
Banerjee and Duflo, 2011; Chliova et al., 2015; Field and Pande, 2008; Shahriar, Schwarz 
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and Newman, 2016). In this respect, by focusing on a sub-set of low-income micro-
entrepreneurs using microcredit services allows us to consider the conditions through 
which financial inclusion occurs because the use of microcredit represents a critical process 
against structural barriers which typically block opportunity and therefore capabilities.  
The method of analysis here is additionally robust as we factor in both the supply of 
microcredit (MICROFINANCE) in conjunction with demand (INCLUSION) so that the 
use of microcredit or lack thereof cannot be solely explained by the presence or absence of 
MFIs willing to serve micro-entrepreneurs. In addition, we recognise the presence of 
informal lending mechanisms in such contexts as a potential funding source for 
entrepreneurs. However, in Latin America, evidence suggests that informal credit accounts 
for 21% of lending but the vast majority of this is for “consumption” loans (i.e. loans for 
consumer purchases rather than an entrepreneurial investment). Given the sole focus of 
micro-entrepreneurs in this study, this suggests that informal use of capital is less relevant 
to this population and for financial inclusion (Sanguinetti, 2011). Where some informal 
use of microcredit by micro-entrepreneurs may be present, this is captured within our 
measure of MICROFINANCE which includes data from the regulated (79%) and non-
regulated microfinance sector (21%). 
 
Calibration and data analysis 
A set-theoretic method is an approach to analysing social phenomena in which the data 
consist of set membership scores, relations between social phenomena are modelled in 
terms of set relations, and these set relations are interpreted in terms of sufficiency and 
necessity, as well as combinations of causes that can be derived from them (Schneider and 
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Wagemann 2012). As a set-theoretic method, this analytical tool is capable of handling the 
increased complexity of multilevel analysis by incorporating it as a series of set 
memberships within the standard configurational comparative approach (Lacey and Fiss 
2009). 
Set relations, however, can only be modelled and assessed if variables are reconsidered 
as sets of things and data is comparable. Given the diversity of measures and scales, we 
used fs/QCA’s calibration procedure to transform the variable raw scores into set measures, 
this by rescaling the original measure into scores ranging from 0.0 to 1.0 (Ragin 2008b). 
This permits to specify inclusion and exclusion of the sets of interest (e.g. set of countries 
with strong equality in the attainment of education) and subsequently to systematically 
compare cases based on how causal conditions combine to produce the outcome under 
examination. In this study, calibration seeks to create fuzzy-set scores that represent strong 
membership in causal conditions and the outcome. In order to do so, we divided the 
calibration procedure into two parts. We first draw on theory and distribution of scores to 
define thresholds for full inclusion, full exclusion and maximum ambiguity, to then square-
root the membership scores and obtain higher inclusion in the relevant sets. Table 1 
presents the calibration criteria for all five measures, and Calibration Table 2 depicts the 
calibration scores for the 19 cases. Raw data for all 19 countries and descriptive and 
correlations for our calibrated measures are available in Appendices B and C respectively. 
------------------------ 
Table 1 here 
------------------------ 
------------------------ 
Table 2 here 
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------------------------ 
 
Calibration enables the construction of a truth table, which lists all different logically 
possible combinations of causal conditions along with the cases conforming to each 
combination. In order to reduce the truth table to simplified combinations, two thresholds 
need to be defined. The frequency threshold specifies the minimum amount of cases to be 
considered in the analysis. Setting a frequency threshold of one observation is acceptable 
when the aim is to build theory from a relatively small sample (Ragin 2006; Crilly 2011). 
The consistency threshold, on the other hand, defines the minimum acceptable level to 
which a combination of causal conditions is reliably associated with the each of the 
outcomes. A consistency threshold of >0.75 is recommended. Table 3 shows the truth table 
with the resulting 9 configurations and 19 cases that are relevant for the outcome. 11 cases 
exceeded the lowest acceptable consistency, set at 0.775, and 8 cases are below the 
consistency cut-off line.  
------------------------ 
Table 3 here 
------------------------ 
 
Results 
In reducing the truth table rows to more simplified combinations of conditions, fs/QCA 
applies a Boolean algorithm based on a counterfactual analysis of causal conditions and 
logical minimization. This procedure yields a solution table (Table 4) comprising four 
simplified combinations of conditions, which can be understood as different solution paths 
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(Ragin, 2008a) or in this case configurations of instrumental freedoms leading to Financial 
Inclusion amongst low-income micro-entrepreneurs. 
------------------------ 
Table 4 here 
------------------------ 
Solution paths are evaluated in terms of consistency and coverage. Set-theoretic 
consistency assesses the degree to which the cases sharing a given condition or 
combination of conditions agree in displaying the outcome under examination. It is 
estimated by dividing the number of cases that are present in a given configuration of 
conditions and exhibit the outcome by the number of cases that are present in the same 
configuration but do not exhibit the outcome (Fiss 2011). Set-theoretic coverage assesses 
the degree to which a causal combination accounts for instances of an outcome (Ragin 
2006), which highlights the empirical power of a particular solution term. If multiple 
configurations are sufficient for the outcome, raw and unique coverage scores provide 
assessments of their empirical relevance (Greckhamer 2011). These set-theoretic measures 
of fit are descriptive, not inferential, and were created to explore cross-case evidence in a 
configurational manner.  
Results confirm that the set relation between configurations of conditions and the 
outcome is highly consistent, with individual results above .81, and an overall consistency 
of .78. The total coverage of the solution is .73 indicating that most of the outcome is 
explained by the causal paths and that the solution as a whole is empirically relevant. The 
solution table distinguishes core and peripheral conditions, which is based on how causal 
components are causally connected to the outcome.  In any causal recipe there are decisive 
or core causal ingredients that distinguish configurations, and complementary ingredients 
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that only make sense as contributing factors (Grandori and Furnari 2008). Large and small 
circles represent core and peripheral conditions, respectively. Black circles are used to 
indicate presence of condition whereas white circles with an X are used to indicate absence 
of the condition. No circle indicates that the condition is irrelevant for explaining the 
outcome under examination. Presence of MICROFINANCE and TRANSPARENCY and 
absence of EDUCATION and CHOICES are core conditions, exhibiting strong causal 
relationship with INCLUSION.  
Findings indicate that strong financial inclusion in developing contexts does not 
depend on a single instrumental freedom (or combination thereof), but emerges from four 
sufficient configurations of causal conditions. Although they differ in terms of empirical 
relevance, the results point out a situation of true multi-conjunctural causality. We 
summarise the four combinations in Table 5. 
------------------------ 
Table 5 here 
------------------------ 
Solution 1: Microfinance, Political Freedom and Transparency 
Solution 1 presents a causal combination of conditions where presence of economic 
freedom (MICROFINANCE) is a core condition accompanied by presence of political 
freedom (CHOICES) and TRANSPARENCY. Despite its importance in producing the 
outcome, microfinance is not sufficient for financial inclusion. In cases such as Chile 
(0.6,0.97) and Colombia (0.54,0.61), provision of microfinance is generally complemented 
by freedom over life choices and low perceived level of public sector corruption. In such 
countries, individuals are free to start and grow their own businesses within institutional 
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neo-liberal contexts exhibiting high government capacity, yet low government 
interference. 
This allows for an understanding of the role of institutional instrumental freedoms and 
how they relate to financial inclusivity in their holistic sense (Sen 1999). In the first 
solution, we identify that financial inclusivity – the rate of microfinance amongst the 
entrepreneurial poor – to be driven by the presence of economic facilities (microfinance), 
political freedom and high transparency (low corruption). This is perhaps the solution 
which is most consistent with current thinking as we would expect more use of 
microfinance where there is provision but also willing use of external financial resources 
in the absence of harassment associated with trading (Fadahunsi and Rosa, 2002).  
Solution 2: Transparency, Political Freedoms and absence of Education 
         In solution 2, presence of TRANSPARENCY and absence of EDUCATION are core 
conditions, however complementary freedoms are needed to produce the outcome. In this 
solution term, the presence of CHOICES reinforces the central features of the core 
conditions. The solution suggests that in countries such as Mexico (0.501,0.88) and El 
Salvador (0.51,0.501) strong financial inclusion results from the lack of social 
opportunities, but presence of political freedom and transparency. Most notably, 
microfinance provision is relatively high in both countries but not relevant for financial 
inclusion, in other words, in contexts with presence of transparency and political freedoms 
and absence of social opportunities, financial inclusion emerges either way with or without 
microfinance provision. Interestingly, corruption levels in these countries are normally 
recognized as relatively high compared to the rest of the region, which may contradict 
common knowledge and hence the relevance of this solution term. We argue that in the 
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setting of interest, corruption is part of the business costs – a ‘corruption norm’ (Budak and 
Rajh, 2014) - moving micro entrepreneurship outside of the system towards informality, 
which facilitates business development due to less harassment with trading. 
Solution 3: Microfinance, Political Freedom and lack of Education 
Solution 3 shows a causal combination of conditions where presence of economic 
freedom and protective security (MICROFINANCE), as core condition, is accompanied 
by absence of social opportunities (EDUCATION) and presence of political freedom 
(CHOICES). In countries such as Bolivia (0.81,0.94) and Ecuador (0.55,0.72), 
microfinance provision is high, which seems to be the primary trigger of high rates of 
microcredit customers among micro entrepreneurs, as these countries show low education 
equality and the importance of freedom over life choices is merely peripheral. In these 
contexts, micro entrepreneurs are scattered through the country in remote areas, not relying 
on central government support, which normally lacks capacity, turning (perception of) 
transparency into an irrelevant condition. Micro entrepreneurs are more autonomous and 
work in conjunction with the local, mission-driven MFIs, since they provide financial 
resources and support in a context with lack of social opportunities. This suggests that 
political freedom is needed for economic freedom to flourish and is therefore a critical 
ingredient for financial inclusivity in contexts where microfinance provision is present or 
absent.  
Solution 4: Absence of all instrumental freedoms 
Finally, solution 4 presents a counterintuitive solution with only one observation, 
suggesting that high rates of microcredit amongst micro-entrepreneurs can occur even 
under odd conditions, in contexts where the lack of all instrumental freedoms can 
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nevertheless lead to financial inclusion amongst micro-entrepreneurs. These contexts are 
historically characterized by authoritarian government and/or military regimes, where there 
is no room for MFIs, being replaced with informal lending. Education is unequal, yet such 
contexts require a closer examination since its effect is not contingent to coverage but rather 
to the content of the education. Interestingly, this case only enables the emergence of that 
possible combination (i.e. lack of all instrumental freedoms), which can only be fundable 
at this stage through counterfactual analysis. This means that such a combination of 
conditions is highly plausible and most likely will lead to strong financial inclusion, but 
this still needs to be found in the empirical world. The causal inference made in solution 4 
is logically possible only in light of the available evidence and alternative causal paths. The 
case of Honduras, with set membership scores of 0.55 in the solution term and 0.16 in the 
outcome, sheds light on a combination of instrumental freedoms that is highly likely to 
lead to financial inclusion, despite the lack of it shown by this particular case.  An important 
benefit of considering outliers and counterintuitive cases is the reduction of expectation 
bias, which means that regardless of the presence of certain expectations, no causal path 
has been downgraded, disbelieved, or discarded. 
These four solutions are theoretical statements, representing causal conjuctures 
leading to financial inclusion. They can also be analyzed and interpreted horizontally, 
which entails observing the individual effect of the most salient conditions in terms of how 
necessary or sufficient are these conditions by themselves to produce financial inclusion. 
In order to do so, we conducted a confirmatory necessity analysis (Table 6), which once 
observed alongside the configurational analysis (Table 4), enables a richer set of findings. 
Our analyses found no single instrumental freedom necessary for financial inclusion. In 
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other words, no condition must be in place to create a situation where the outcome can 
occur. In spite of the empirical relevance of economic freedom (microfinance) and the 
consistency of political freedom, none of them constitute a necessary condition for strong 
financial inclusion amongst micro-entrepreneurs, as most literature assumes. We observe 
that microfinance is predominant across Latin America and the Caribbean, but its effect on 
financial inclusion is highly inconsistent. On the other hand, political freedom is not 
omnipresent across region, but where political freedom is strong micro entrepreneurs 
appear to flourish alongside MFIs, showing therefore a consistent effect on producing 
financial inclusion. This leads us to argue that financial inclusion is possible without 
economic freedom (microfinance) but mostly unfeasible without political freedom.  
------------------------ 
Table 6 here 
------------------------ 
 
Low Financial Inclusion amongst micro-entrepreneurs 
Our analyses also found eight countries with weak financial inclusion and inconsistent 
combinations of instrumental freedoms. In analyzing how conditions combine and relate 
to the outcome of interest within this group, we observed three distinct sets of countries 
and one outlier. The first group includes Argentina (education -> ~inclusion 0.05) and 
Venezuela (education -> ~inclusion 0.05). Both countries show similar political institutions 
developed over the last two decades, which have prioritized a large welfare state capable 
of providing strong equality of education, yet unsustainable due to their underperforming 
economic systems. The level of financial inclusion however is extremely low and can be 
explained by the lack of political and economic freedoms (microfinance) and transparency. 
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Social opportunities are not sufficient in a highly corrupt context lacking freedom over life 
choices. In addition, both countries exhibit a shallow financial sector, high interest rates 
(>50%) within a context with extremely low microfinance provision (<2%). Three 
countries from the Caribbean also exhibit similar conditions leading to relatively low 
financial inclusion: Dominican Republic (choices -> 0.34), Nicaragua (choices -> 0.45), 
Guatemala (choices -> 0.42). Similarly, Panama and Paraguay exhibit high levels of social 
opportunities and political freedom, yet dissimilar levels of financial inclusion. 
Perhaps one of the most interesting counterintuitive cases in the sample is Uruguay, 
as it shows robust instrumental freedoms (social opportunities, political freedom and 
transparency), yet low levels of microfinance among micro entrepreneurs (membership 
score of 0.12). We suspect that its unique political and economic system (welfare state; 
community safety nets; and informal sources) has led to create a situation where the lack 
of financial inclusion, as measured, can be explained by the fact that micro lending for 
micro entrepreneurs is already embedded in the system.  
 
Contribution, Future Research and Limitations 
In this paper we asked, how do the interrelated nature of instrumental freedoms combine 
to engender financial inclusivity amongst micro-entrepreneurs? This places the focus of 
our inquiry on the interrelationship between instrumental freedoms rather than on the 
individual factors contained in the overall notion of freedom, as the associated causal 
relationships are not discrete but rather conjunctural in nature. To examine these 
relationships, we need to go beyond the traditional decomposability logic used in linear 
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modeling, where the outcome of interest is explained as the sum of net effects of the 
individual predictors (Ragin and Fiss 2010).  
Acknowledging the need for a different analytical approach, we draw from the seminal 
work of Sen (1999; 2005) to examine the causal configurations associated with financial 
inclusion amongst low-income micro-entrepreneurs in Latin America. Our findings 
indicate that financial inclusion in developing contexts does not depend on one single 
instrumental freedom. In particular, we identify that the presence of microfinance 
(economic freedom) does not necessarily produce financial inclusion but that it is mostly 
not feasible without the presence of political freedom. Our analysis indicates that financial 
inclusion stems from four sufficient configurations of causal conditions. As such, we make 
a number of contributions to the literature that we will outline in the following.  
Firstly, we contribute to the existing view within the literature concerning the role of 
the institutional environment in microfinance. We argued that the current view in the 
literature suggests that a particular set of institutional conditions may produce particular 
development outcomes neglecting their view as freedoms within institutional settings – 
moving away from the idea of ‘transcendental institutionalism’, as outlined by Sen (2009). 
Although institutions and freedoms are naturally intertwined, instrumental freedoms are a 
more relevant focus of analysis because they reveal fully their complex interrelations that 
actually contribute to financial inclusion.  
This is highlighted in the results through Solution 2 which demonstrates the presence 
of transparency guarantees, lack of social opportunities (education) and political freedoms 
(freedom over life choices) that leads to financial inclusion. This is despite an objective 
sense that the countries in this solution (see Appendix D) would typically be viewed as 
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having high levels of corruption yet it has no bearing on the outcome. In freedom terms, 
we suggest that corruption can actually be viewed as a business norm and part of the day-
to-day entrepreneurial landscape, having a limited perceived bearing on their willingness 
to invest loans and trade i.e. financial inclusion.   
By shifting the focus onto instrumental freedoms as a consequence of the institutional 
context, we get a more accurate reflection of the moulding effect of the context. This 
reinforces the idea that a search for a ‘perfect’ set of developed institutional conditions that 
lead to financial inclusion amongst micro-entrepreneurs is unlikely – the transcendental 
argument. Again, this is emphasized in Solution 2 which shows that financial inclusion 
emerges either way with or without “microfinance provision” (Newman et al., 2013). This 
indicates that in these contexts (see Appendix D) the lines between ‘mission-driven’ 
microfinance and the commercial banking sector are blurred to the extent that the financial 
system as a whole is now more inclusive with commercial banks delivering products and 
services to the entrepreneurial poor; something hinted at by Khavul et al. (2013). In 
addition, this seems to rely on the absence of corruption suggesting that integrating the 
entrepreneurial poor into the established financial system relies on the instrumental 
freedom of transparency.   
Secondly, we contribute towards a more institutionally complex view of microfinance 
activity. We argued that previous empirical efforts in this area lack analytical power 
because they rely on joint interactions between a set of variables that loses the holistic case-
based configuration of instrumental freedoms and complexity of how they interact with 
each other (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, and Lounsbury, 2011; Munoz and 
Kibler, 2016). In our results, this is highlighted by the four causal conjuctures we present 
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that offer the most appropriate application of the interrelatedness of instrumental freedoms 
in Sen’s (1999; 2005) capability theory. This emphasizes the “remarkable empirical 
connection that links freedoms of different kinds with one another” (1999, p.11). We 
present four solutions that each provide individual paths to financial inclusion. Despite the 
heterogeneity across the solutions, we see one consistent theme across the first three; the 
empirical connection between political freedom as a peripheral condition for financial 
inclusivity. However, despite its supportive role (due to its low coverage across the region) 
it is highly consistent across those countries with strong financial inclusivity, suggesting a 
situation of robust quasi-necessity, which means that if that condition is removed, financial 
inclusivity will most likely disappear. This is supported by the negate analysis of the 
outcome (~outcome). Here we can observe a consistency in cases where there are a lack of 
political freedoms and very low financial inclusion. Typically, political freedom (freedom 
from oppression, coercion, right to criticize authority etc.) has an empirical link with 
economic security in the sense that more politically inclusive societies tend to be more 
open, stable and prosperous (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).  
If we are, on the contrary, to focus on aggregated net effect, we would be forced to 
assume that all freedoms are necessary for financial inclusion in entrepreneurship, when in 
real-world social science we know that the importance of a given institutional factor is 
context and temporal sensitive or be altogether peripheral in nature (Munoz and Dimov, 
2015). Our analysis indeed assumes that the instrumental freedoms under examination are 
neither necessary nor sufficient for financial inclusion, and that they will only make sense 
when considered together. Microfinance provision is particularly interesting in this regard. 
While it has been seen as central for the emergence of “inclusive” entrepreneurship, we 
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have observed that financial inclusion seems actually possible without economic freedom 
(microfinance provision), but it seems to be unfeasible without political freedom. From an 
MFI perspective, this suggests that lenders require a workable and open political context 
to operate in. From a borrower’s perspective, this suggests that micro-entrepreneurs may 
also require politically open and inclusive contexts as an aspect of the ‘appropriability 
regime”, where they can capture sufficient value from business opportunities – political 
and entrepreneurial agency appear intertwined (Baker et al., 2005).  
Finally, our work makes an important contribution to literature by retaining and 
discussing the role of counterintuitive solutions and cases, which when seen and analyzed 
by means of traditional linear models are treated as errors and thus dropped from the 
analysis. Counterintuitive solutions represent theoretical statements only discoverable by 
counterfactual analysis and logical testing. Despite its low empirical representation in our 
small sample of countries, Solution 4 is highly likely to emerge either in a larger sample or 
in the future, constituting a powerful tool to predict financial inclusivity within otherwise 
odd contexts. This is one of the most salient benefits of fs/QCA, and we hope it will inspire 
future work in the area. 
Relations between variables in configurational comparative studies are theoretically 
informed (Ragin 2008), where the direction of causality for individual factors is known, 
yet the way they work in combination in a particular empirical setting is hidden. The idea 
of fs/QCA being a method for devising how different ingredients can be combined in 
alternative causal recipes for baking a “cake” illustrates this understanding of causality. 
Nevertheless, in any case where reverse causality can be seen as credibility risk, we are 
obliged to corroborate that the direction inferred ex-ante holds when tested. This is 
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particularly relevant when a condition and an outcome share certain aspects, as in this case 
of microcredit. In our study, microcredit is both present within a condition portraying size 
of microcredit portfolio (offer) and within the outcome as a component of the measure that 
enable us to estimate financial inclusion, as the rate of microcredit clients among micro-
entrepreneurs (demand). In dissipating such a concern, we run two tests: a subset/superset 
analysis to evaluate whether our measure of financial inclusion is a subset or superset of 
microcredit provision, and an alternative fs/QCA switching the outcome and causal 
conditions. Both tests confirm the robustness of the results.   
Aside from our contribution, there are limitations to our study that also need to be 
considered. Firstly, we discuss financial inclusion as an important process for overcoming 
structural barriers given the clear link in extant research between microcredit and positive 
entrepreneurial outcomes. Although financial inclusion is clearly important for stimulating 
entrepreneurship, research has found a less clear link between this and wider well-being 
outcomes. Given that entrepreneurs operate in complex systems, such a complexity 
perspective (as adopted in this paper through our methodology) raises significant questions 
about the degree to which an intervention (such as bringing someone into the formal 
financial system) can actually be attributed to the intervention itself (Byrne and Callaghan 
2014). This kind of investigation that embraces real world complexity through fs/QCA 
methodology and microfinance’s broader relationship with well-being outcomes would be 
a fruitful avenue for future research.  
Secondly, we focus our analysis in Latin America and the Caribbean. To the extent 
that this only represents one broad contextual setting for the research – but sufficiently 
homogenous and with maximum heterogeneity to perform a fs/QCA – our extrapolation of 
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the results to different settings should be made with caution. Second, our analysis is 
restricted to the total amount of the microcredit portfolio (microfinance provision) across 
each individual country including a wide range of sources, yet we can say much about the 
individual, and presumably distinct effect of the different types of MFIs. These are wide 
and varied in terms of their motives, activities and products which can provide some more 
insightful detail into the country level data concerning economic freedoms. We strongly 
encourage future research to go under the hood of MFIs to observe the varying effect of 
the different types of organizations on financial inclusivity such as non-formal and non-
regulated micro-lending.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we asked, how do the interrelated nature of instrumental freedoms combine 
to engender financial inclusivity amongst micro-entrepreneurs? Drawing from Sen’s 
capabilities perspective, we argued for a need to focus on instrumental freedoms as a 
function of their institutional context. This approach requires embracing the causal 
complexity associated with financial inclusion. By conducting an fs/QCA of Latin 
American and Caribbean countries, our results highlight four causal conjuctures as 
theoretical constructions that depict the distinctive paths for financial inclusion. In viewing 
this as a complex causal process, we are able to demonstrate that no single instrumental 
freedom is necessary for financial inclusion and that it requires more than just the provision 
of microfinance.  
 Uncovering the antecedents of financial inclusion is certainly central to alleviate 
some of today’s most pressing problems. Provision of microfinance has been assumed to 
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play a pivotal role towards this end in that it enables economic activity of micro-
entrepreneurs. While relevant, our configurational examination demonstrates that, by itself, 
it is insufficient to engender financial inclusion amongst this population, requiring 
additional enabling factors which we observed through the lens of freedoms, with political 
freedoms playing a particularly strong role. Most notably, we discovered that this is not a 
one-size-fits all recipe because financial inclusion can occur under alternative and even 
odd combinations of freedoms. Four possible configurations emerged from our data, 
representing alternative theoretical and policy statements that robustly deal with and inform 
the empirical complexity laying at the intersection of micro-entrepreneurship, 
microfinance and financial inclusion.  
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Tables  
Table 1. Calibration criteria 
Condition Full in COP Full out 
Microfinance provision 336 105 20 
Education equality 82 79 70 
Freedom over life choices 95 70 50 
Transparency 66 39 21 
Financial inclusion 54 24 10 
 
 
Table 2. Calibration table 
Case 
Microfinance 
Provision 
Education 
Equality 
Freedom over 
life choices 
Transparency Financial 
Inclusion 
Argentina 0.03 1 0.59 0.46 0.05 
Bolivia 0.97 0.1 0.81 0.501 0.94 
Brazil 0.04 0.23 0.51 0.65 0.14 
Chile 0.83 1 0.6 0.95 0.97 
Colombia 0.6 0.41 0.75 0.54 0.61 
Costa Rica 0.63 1 0.93 0.82 0.15 
Dominican Republic 0.11 0.27 0.9 0.39 0.34 
Ecuador 0.78 0.45 0.55 0.43 0.72 
El Salvador 0.57 0.04 0.51 0.58 0.501 
Guatemala 0.07 0.01 0.83 0.39 0.42 
Honduras 0.06 0.05 0.45 0.29 0.16 
Jamaica 0.79 1 0.72 0.56 0.17 
Mexico 0.38 0.47 0.67 0.501 0.88 
Nicaragua 0.08 0.02 0.78 0.26 0.45 
Panama 0.08 0.99 0.9 0.54 0.09 
Paraguay 0.36 0.98 0.91 0.16 0.88 
Peru 0.55 0.18 0.501 0.56 0.7 
Uruguay 0.16 1 0.91 0.95 0.12 
Venezuela 0.05 0.97 0.26 0.08 0.05 
 47 
Table 3. Truth table 
Microfinance 
Provision 
Education 
Equality 
Freedom over 
life choices 
Transparency Cases Financial 
Inclusion 
Consist. 
1 0 1 0 1 1 1.000 
1 0 1 1 4 1 0.997 
0 0 1 1 2 1 0.860 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0.809 
1 1 1 1 3 1 0.775 
0 0 1 0 3 0 0.741 
0 1 1 0 2 0 0.715 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0.626 
0 1 1 1 2 0 0.587 
 
Table 4. Solution table 
   Solutions  
Configurations 1 2 3 4 
Microfinance Provision  -   
Education Equality -    
Freedom over life choices     
Transparency   -  
Consistency 0.83 0.88 0.99 0.81 
Raw coverage 0.54 0.52 0.45 0.3 
Unique coverage 0.16 0.073 0.057 0.0 
Overall consistency 0.78  
Overall coverage 0.73  
Model: financial inclusion = f(choices, education, provision, transparency)   
N=19; frequency cutoff: 1; consistency cutoff: 0.774 
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Table 5. Descriptive Solution table 
Solution Conditions  Implications 
1 Present: Microfinance (economic 
freedom); Political Freedom; 
Transparency 
Financial inclusion amongst low income micro-
entrepreneurs occurs in conditions where MFIs 
are willing to lend, entrepreneurs are free from 
oppression and corruption.  
2 Present: Transparency, Political 
Freedoms  
Absent: Education 
Financial inclusion amongst low income micro-
entrepreneurs occurs in conditions where 
entrepreneurs are free from oppression and 
corruption but lack educational opportunities. 
3 Present: Microfinance (economic 
freedom), Political Freedom  
Absent: Education 
Financial inclusion amongst low income micro-
entrepreneurs occurs in conditions where MFIs 
are willing to lend and entrepreneurs are free 
from oppression but lack educational 
opportunities.  
4 Absent: Microfinance (economic 
freedom), Political Freedom, Education, 
Transparency 
Financial inclusion amongst low income micro-
entrepreneurs occurs in conditions where MFIs 
are not willing to lend, entrepreneurs not free 
from oppression and corruption, and lack 
educational opportunities.  
 
 
Table 6. Analysis of Necessary Conditions  
Condition tested Consistency Coverage 
Choices  0.870639 0.555156 
Microfinance provision 0.700276 0.818067 
Transparency 0.726891 0.630774 
Education equality 0.553890 0.454277 
~ Choices  0.480638 0.677310 
~ Microfinance provision 0.611437 0.430017 
~Transparency 0.701115 0.622923 
~Education equality  0.640331 0.604870 
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Appendix A. Correlations 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Portfolio size US$         
2 N MF Clients .902**        
3 SI.POV.NOP25 0.429 .736**       
4 SI.POV.NOP4 .527* .815** .979**      
5 SI.POV.NOP5 .550* .843** .967** .998**     
6 SP.POP.TOTL .501* .796** .931** .976** .983**    
7 U$MF/Hab 0.338 0.054 -0.23 -0.26 -0.226 -0.247   
8 U$MF/MF CL -0.222 -0.341 -0.366 -0.352 -0.322 -0.293 0.252  
9 MF institutions  .640** .654** .471* .478* .484* 0.414 0.198 -0.433 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Appendix B. Raw scores 
Case Choices Equality 
education 
Transparency Microfinance 
provision 
Financial 
Inclusion 
Argentina 72.93 91.38 34 4.1 1.56 
Bolivia 82.25 72.40 35 373.4 60.04 
Brazil 70.38 75.30 43 12.6 12.19 
Chile 73.30 86.30 73 228.1 69.04 
Colombia 79.09 77.90 37 136.2 32.36 
Costa Rica 91.94 84.30 54 145.5 12.44 
Dominican Republic 88.55 76.00 32 44.6 21.29 
Ecuador 71.62 78.40 33 203.5 37.92 
El Salvador 70.36 69.80 39 126.9 29.89 
Guatemala 83.21 63.90 32 31.5 24.46 
Honduras 68.53 70.43 29 24.6 13.42 
Jamaica 78.05 89.40 38 207.1 13.69 
Mexico 75.80 78.60 35 91.1 50.28 
Nicaragua 80.50 66.70 28 37.7 25.27 
Panama 88.61 83.70 37 35.5 7.21 
Paraguay 89.39 82.80 24 88.6 50.71 
Peru 70.01 74.40 38 119.4 36.61 
Uruguay 88.89 89.10 73 58.4 10.15 
Venezuela 63.12 82.40 19 23.8 2.6 
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Appendix C. Descriptive and correlations 
 Min Max Mean SD 1 2 3 4 
1 Choices 0.26 0.93 0.68 0.19     
2 Microfinance provision 0.03 0.97 0.37 0.32 0.058    
3 Transparency 0.08 0.95 0.50 0.23 0.255 0.379   
4 Education equality 0.01 1 0.53 0.42 0.172 0.056 0.265  
Financial Inclusion  0.05 0.97 0.43 0.33 0.082 .626** 0.025 -0.252 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Appendix D. Cases and solution terms 
Solution 1 Solution 2 Solution 3 Solution 4 Excluded cases* 
Chile (0.6,0.97) 
Colombia 
(0.54,0.61) 
El Salvador 
(0.51,0.501) 
Bolivia 
(0.501,0.94) 
Peru (0.501,0.7) 
 
Jamaica (0.56,0.17) 
Costa Rica 
(0.63,0.15) 
Colombia 
(0.54,0.61) 
El Salvador 
(0.51,0.501) 
Bolivia 
(0.501,0.94)   
Mexico 
(0.501,0.88) 
Peru (0.501,0.7)  
 
Brazil (0.51,0.14) 
Bolivia (0.81,0.94) 
Colombia 
(0.59,0.61) 
Ecuador 
(0.55,0.72)  
El Salvador 
(0.51,0.501) 
Peru (0.501,0.7)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Honduras 
(0.55,0.16)  
Argentina 
Venezuela 
Dominican 
Republic 
Nicaragua 
Guatemala 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Uruguay 
*Cases with low financial inclusion (<0.5) and inconsistent combinations of conditions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
